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für phänomenologische Forschung

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211180

Kant on luck

Nafsika Athanassoulis

pp. 100-113

Abstrakt

There is limited discussion of Kant in the debate on moral luck. This is because the Kantian position is presented as entirely incompatible with the possibility of luck and this is interpreted as a serious problem for Kant (interpreted as such mainly by Aristotelian-inspired theories which claim to have a more plausible account of goodness because they are willing to accept it is vulnerable to luck).

Publication details

Published in:

Athanassoulis Nafsika (2005) Morality, moral luck and responsibility: fortune's web. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

Seiten: 100-113

DOI: 10.1057/9780230508040_7

Referenz:

Athanassoulis Nafsika (2005) Kant on luck, In: Morality, moral luck and responsibility, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 100–113.