Zeitschrift | Band | Artikel
Mechanistic and non-mechanistic varieties of dynamical models in cognitive science
explanatory power, understanding, and the "mere description" worry
pp. 43-66
Abstrakt
In the literature on dynamical models in cognitive science, two issues have recently caused controversy. First, what is the relation between dynamical and mechanistic models? I will argue that dynamical models can be upgraded to be mechanistic as well, and that there are mechanistic and non-mechanistic dynamical models. Second, there is the issue of explanatory power. Since it is uncontested the mechanistic models can explain, I will focus on the non-mechanistic variety of dynamical models. It is often claimed by proponents of mechanistic explanations that such models do not really explain cognitive phenomena (the ‘mere description’ worry). I will argue against this view. Although I agree that the three arguments usually offered to vindicate the explanatory power of non-mechanistic dynamical models (predictive power, counterfactual support, and unification) are not enough, I consider a fourth argument, namely that such models provide understanding. The Voss strong anticipation model is used to illustrate this.
Publication details
Published in:
(2015) Synthese 192 (1).
Seiten: 43-66
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-014-0548-5
Referenz:
Gervais Raoul (2015) „Mechanistic and non-mechanistic varieties of dynamical models in cognitive science: explanatory power, understanding, and the "mere description" worry“. Synthese 192 (1), 43–66.