Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

Series | Buch | Kapitel



Bayne Tim (2010) The unity of consciousness. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Bermúdez José Luis (2011) „Bodily awareness and self-consciousness“, In: S. Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford handbook of the self, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 157–179.

Billon Alexandre, Kriegel Uriah (2015) „Jaspers' dilemma: The psychopathological challenge to subjectivity theories of consciousness“, In: R. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed consciousness, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, n/a.

Blanke Olaf, Metzinger Thomas (2009) „Full-body illusions and minimal phenomenal selfhood“. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13 (1), 7–13.

Bortolotti Lisa (2010) Delusions and other irrational beliefs. Oxford-New York, Oxford University Press.

Brentano Franz (1995) Descriptive psychology, ed. Müller Benito. London-New York, Routledge.

Brentano Franz (1982) Deskriptive Psychologie, ed. Chisholm Roderick, Baumgartner Wilhelm. Hamburg, Meiner.

Campbell John (1999) „Schizophrenia, the space of reasons and thinking as a motor process“. The Monist 82, 609–625.

Carruthers Peter (2000) Phenomenal consciousness: A naturalistic theory. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Dainton Barry (2004) „The self and the phenomena“. Ratio 17 (4), 365–389.

Dainton Barry (2008) The phenomenal self. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Dretske Fred (2002) „How do you know that you are not a zombie?“, In: B. Gertler (ed.), Privileged access, Aldershot, Ashgate.

Fernández Jordi (2010) „Thought insertion and self-knowledge“. Mind and Language 25, 66–88.

Gallagher Shaun (2000) „Self-reference and schizophrenia: A cognitive model of immunity to error through misidentification“, In: D. Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the self, Amsterdam, Benjamins, 203–242.

Ganeri Jonardon (1999) „Self-intimation, memory and personal identity“. Journal of Indian Philosophy 27, 469–483.

Graham George (2010) The disordered mind: An introduction to philosophy of mind and mental illness. Abingdon, Routledge.

Harman Gilbert (1990) „The intrinsic quality of experience“. Philosophical Perspectives 4, 31–52.

Hume David (1888) A treatise of human nature. Oxford, Clarendon Press.

Jaspers Karl (1963) General psychopathology. Manchester, Manchester University Press.

Kriegel Uriah (2003) „Consciousness as intransitive self-consciousness: Two views and an argument“. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33, 103–132.

Kriegel Uriah (2009) Subjective consciousness: A self-representational theory. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Lane Timothy (2012) „Toward an explanatory framework for mental ownership“. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2), 251–286.

Levine Joseph (2004) Purple haze: The puzzle of consciousness. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Margolis Joseph (1988) „Minds, selves, and persons“. Topoi 7, 31–45.

Metzinger Thomas (2003) Being no one: The self-model theory of subjectivity. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press

Prinz Jesse (2014) „Waiting for the self“, In: J. Liu & J. Perry (eds.), Consciousness and the self, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, n/a.

Prinz Wolfgang (2003) „Emerging selves: Representational foundations of subjectivity“. Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4), 512–528.

Rosenthal David (1997) „A theory of consciousness“, In: N.J. Block, O. Flanagan & G. Güzeldere (eds.), The nature of consciousness, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, n/a.

Sartre Jean-Paul (2003) Being and nothingness. London, Routledge.

Schear Joseph (2009) „Experience and self-consciousness“. Philosophical Studies 144, 95–105.

Shoemaker Sydney (1994) „Phenomenal character“. Noûs 28, 21–38.

Strawson Galen (2011) „The minimal subject“, In: S. Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford handbook of the self, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 253–278.

Thomasson Amie L (2000) „After Brentano: A one-level theory of consciousness“. European Journal of Philosophy 8 (2), 190–210.

Tye Michael (1995) Ten problems of consciousness. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press

Zahavi Dan (1999) Self-awareness and alterity: A phenomenological investigation. Evanston, Ill., Northwestern University Press

Zahavi Dan (2000) „Self and consciousness“, In: D. Zahavi (ed.), Exploring the self, Amsterdam, Benjamins, 55–74.

Zahavi Dan (2005) Subjectivity and selfhood: Investigating the first-person perspective. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press

Zahavi Dan (2011) „The experiential self: Objections and clarifications“, In: E. Thompson, D. Zahavi & M. Siderits (eds.), Self, no self?, Oxford, Oxford University Press, n/a.

Zahavi Dan (2014) Self and other: Exploring subjectivity, empathy, and shame. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

Publication details

Published in:

Dahlstrom Daniel, Elpidorou Andreas, Hopp Walter (2016) Philosophy of mind and phenomenology: Conceptual and empirical approaches. London-New York, Routledge.


Zahavi Dan, Kriegel Uriah (2016) „For-me-ness: What it is and what it is not“, In: D. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou & W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of mind and phenomenology, London-New York, Routledge, n/a.