Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

Series | Buch | Kapitel

148942

Playing

Nathan Rotenstreich

pp. 81-101

Abstrakt

In the first place we must explain why we use the term "playing' as a title for this part of our analysis. We are here following Irving Goffman — to whom we shall frequently refer — who says: "In the literature on games, a distinction is made between a game, defined as a body of rules associated with the lore regarding good starting, and a play, defined as any particular instance of a given game being played from beginning to end. Playing could then be defined as the process of move-taking through which a given play is initiated and eventually completed; action is involved, but only the strictly game-relevant aspects of action.'1 Attempting to integrate this distinction into the texture of our argument, it will become clear that we are focussing on action or on activity, though, as will emerge, there is no action without a meaning or, in the case before us, without rules.

Publication details

Published in:

Rotenstreich Nathan (1985) Reflection and action. Dordrecht, Springer.

Seiten: 81-101

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-9738-3_5

Referenz:

Rotenstreich Nathan (1985) Playing, In: Reflection and action, Dordrecht, Springer, 81–101.