"Subjectivism" or "subjective" is often used in philosophy in a more or less evaluative sense and rather disapprovingly. Thus, idealistic philosophy, for instance, in its primary phase has been charged by realists at large with subjectivism. The like charge of subjectivism is not unlikely to be brought against the new philosophical discipline of Phenomenology. And that may be partly because of its typical — and sometimes not unambiguous — outlook and method, and partly also because of misunderstanding with regard to its peculiarly non-committal standpoint. So it is worth examining the question whether and how far phenomenology can actually be called a subjective philosophy, i.e., a philosophy open to the charge of subjectivism — the latter being evidently taken in its narrow condemnatory sense. The later part of the Chapter (section 6 in particular) would further be concerned with the question in what sense does the principle of subjectivity play a central role in phenomenology.¹