Impossible colours
Wittgenstein and the naturalist's challenge
pp. 107-121
Abstrakt
With the rise of naturalistic philosophy, conceptual analysis has faded into the background, and Ludwig Wittgenstein's account of reddish green and transparent white as grammatically excluded has been written off or ignored. While his view of such impossible colours is, as he himself saw, open to question, so too is the naturalist's alternative.
Publication details
Published in:
Silva Marcos (2017) How colours matter to philosophy. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 107-121
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-67398-1_6
Referenz:
Lugg Andrew (2017) „Impossible colours: Wittgenstein and the naturalist's challenge“, In: M. Silva (ed.), How colours matter to philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer, 107–121.