When the results of the methodological discussions of Parts One and Two of my study are juxtaposed, the common theme of Husserl's and Heidegger's understanding of phenomenology may be summed up with the well-known phrase: zurück zu den Sachen selbst (return to the matters themselves). Indeed, it is their common philosophical commitment to what Heidegger refers to as "the meaning of all genuine philosophical "empiricism' (Empirie)" (BT, 490 n10/50n), i.e., to the non-constructivistic disclosure of the a priori, that initially makes possible the phenomenological dialogue between these two thinkers. However, as the quotation marks around the word "empiricism" no doubt indicate, Heidegger has reservations about the precise nature of the apriority uncovered in Husserl's understanding of the "method of every scientific philosophy which understands itself" (BT,490 n. 10/50n). These reservations come into bold relief with the consideration of the matters themselves, discussed above, with respect to each thinker's philosophical understanding of the meaning of the "return" expressed in their commonly embraced maxim "to the matters themselves."