Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

Series | Buch | Kapitel

148334

Searching for the lost subject

Alexei Chernyakov

pp. 157-185

Abstrakt

We have already seen that in Aristotle's description of the mechanism of the "soul" the metaphor of place, expressed or implied, plays a major role. The soul is a kind of a map of abilities or powers (δυνáμεlς), and these powers in action form the system of energeiai having various internal forms. The unity of the soul so described is a topological, structural unity. Strictly speaking the soul itself is the principle of unity, since it is "the form (εlδoς) of a natural body, which potentially has life" (De anima II 1, 412a20f. ). The soul is the internal form or the essence (oυσlα) of a living body as such it comprises and unites all manifestations or ener;eiai of life (for the soul itself is the first entelechy of a living body (412a27), including, if we mean man, the energeia of intelligence (υόησlς) and the energeia of circumspection (φρόυησlς), i. e., the energeia of good deeds.

Publication details

Published in:

Chernyakov Alexei (2002) The ontology of time: being and time in the philosophies of Aristotle, Husserl and Heidegger. Dordrecht, Springer.

Seiten: 157-185

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-3407-3_7

Referenz:

Chernyakov Alexei (2002) Searching for the lost subject, In: The ontology of time, Dordrecht, Springer, 157–185.