Object, positum, concept
pp. 97-121
Abstrakt
The dissatisfaction and discontent observed in contemporary philosophy concerning knowledge expressed in terms of and by means of concepts springs chiefly from the fact that concepts, as a means of cognizing, appear to be determinate. Consequently, that is, they appear as limited. This is not a contingency, a temporary deficiency. It is our only, and so necessary, way of making a concept "logical."
Publication details
Published in:
Špet Gustav (1991) Appearance and sense: Phenomenology as the fundamental science and its problems. Dordrecht-Boston-London, Kluwer.
Seiten: 97-121
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-3292-3_6
Referenz:
Špet Gustav (1991) Object, positum, concept, In: Appearance and sense, Dordrecht-Boston-London, Kluwer, 97–121.