Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

Series | Buch | Kapitel

149438

The ontological dimensions of the body

Richard Zaner

pp. 81-105

Abstrakt

There is an initial difficulty in attempting to study the body, one which, Sartre states, arises especially for Cartesian philosophy. If one begins by considering the body as a certain neurological-physiological complex defined by certain physico-chemical laws — in short, as a thing on a par with any other physical thing, although perchance more complicated — and in addition by considering consciousness as an interiority, then the effort to connect these two is doomed to failure. For, it is an effort to unite my consciousness, not with my body, but with the body-of-the-Other. My own body as it is for me cannot be apprehended in sensuous perception like other physical things, including the body of the Other. I do not sense my skeleton, my brain, my nerve-endings, and the like; and even coenesthetic, proprioceptive, and kinaesthetic data are not apprehended by me as objects.

Publication details

Published in:

Zaner Richard (1971) The problem of embodiment: some contributions to a phenomenology of the body. Dordrecht, Springer.

Seiten: 81-105

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-3014-4_5

Referenz:

Zaner Richard (1971) The ontological dimensions of the body, In: The problem of embodiment, Dordrecht, Springer, 81–105.