Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

Series | Buch | Kapitel

150429

The fundamental limitation of Locke's sphere of vision and its reasons

Edmund Husserl

pp. 80-104

Abstrakt

We can also express what we said at the end of last lecture in the following manner. Locke did not see the radical problem of cog- nition raised by ancient skepticism, and so this problem, naturally enough, is not the topic of his Essay. And yet the Essay purports to be a theory of the understanding, an epistemology—indeed an epistemology that is supposed to bring to an end the perpetual disputes of metaphysics, and to complete and perfect all the sciences through a clarification of the true meaning of their achievements and of the ultimate source of their basic concepts and methods.

Publication details

Published in:

Husserl Edmund (2019) First philosophy: lectures 1923/24 and related texts from the manuscripts (1920-1925). Dordrecht, Springer.

Seiten: 80-104

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-024-1597-1_5

Referenz:

Husserl Edmund (2019) The fundamental limitation of Locke's sphere of vision and its reasons, In: First philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer, 80–104.