DOMINIQUE BEGUE: Ellipsis and literal meaning in SearIe's theory. Searle puts forward the idea that the postulates constitutive of meaning are basically incomplete and suggests that there is no such thing as a «zero or context» for an utterance. This annihilates Frege's contrast between potential reference and actual reference. Searle is thus led to distinguish two types of ellipsis connected to the speaker's activity: contextual ellipsis and contingent ellipsis. Contingent ellipsis is linked to the definition of the postulates that constitute meaning. Similarly, Searle is led to distinguish between «contingent» presupposition and contextual presupposition. Besides the reformulation of presupposition theory, Searle's questioning the existence of literal meaning compels him to take a stand on the relation between language and truth. Such a position, clearly deducible from Searle's proposals, eventually casts doubt on the linguistic specificity of the linguist's present field of study.