Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

Buch | Kapitel

176027

The concept of "psychologism' in Frege and Husserl

J. N. Mohanty

pp. 12-31

Abstrakt

Both Frege and Husserl are well-known to have campaigned against a philosophical position known as psychologism. In this essay, I will begin by focusing upon the nature of psychologism in general, and then on the specific sort or sorts of psychologism Frege and Husserl were up against, before looking at the arguments they pressed against that position. Finally, I will ask if a radical anti-psychologistic position is a defensible one.

Publication details

Published in:

Mohanty Jithendra Nath (1999) Logic, truth and the modalities: from a phenomenological perspective. Dordrecht, Springer.

Seiten: 12-31

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-2113-4_2

Referenz:

Mohanty Jithendra Nath (1999) The concept of "psychologism' in Frege and Husserl, In: Logic, truth and the modalities, Dordrecht, Springer, 12–31.