Meaning and mental representation
pp. 77-84
Abstrakt
Husserl and Fodor both accept a representational theory of mind (RTM). Both individuate mental states by their contents, which are provided by mental representations or noematic Sinn. Both adhere to methodological solipsism; mental states are theoretically isolated from environmental and social causes and effects. Their principled blindness to mind-world causal connections ally Husserl and Fodor in a common antipathy to "naturalistic psychology" which would insist that mental states cannot be identified without considering their causes and the contexts in which they occur.
Publication details
Published in:
Otto Herbert, Tuedio James (1988) Perspectives on mind. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 77-84
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-4033-8_7
Referenz:
Emmett Kathleen (1988) „Meaning and mental representation“, In: H. Otto & J. Tuedio (eds.), Perspectives on mind, Dordrecht, Springer, 77–84.