Buch | Kapitel
Structuralism and the concept of set
pp. 171-194
Abstrakt
In mathematics, I claim, we do not have objects with an “internal” composition arranged in structures, we have only structures. The objects of mathematics, that is, the entities which our mathematical constants and quantifiers denote, are structureless points or positions in structures. As positions in structures, they have no identity or features outside of a structure.1
Publication details
Published in:
Agazzi Evandro, Darvas György (1997) Philosophy of mathematics today. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 171-194
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-5690-5_10
Referenz:
Parsons Charles (1997) „Structuralism and the concept of set“, In: E. Agazzi & G. Darvas (eds.), Philosophy of mathematics today, Dordrecht, Springer, 171–194.