Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

Buch | Kapitel

182136

Structuralism and the concept of set

Charles Parsons

pp. 171-194

Abstrakt

In mathematics, I claim, we do not have objects with an “internal” composition arranged in structures, we have only structures. The objects of mathematics, that is, the entities which our mathematical constants and quantifiers denote, are structureless points or positions in structures. As positions in structures, they have no identity or features outside of a structure.1

Publication details

Published in:

Agazzi Evandro, Darvas György (1997) Philosophy of mathematics today. Dordrecht, Springer.

Seiten: 171-194

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-5690-5_10

Referenz:

Parsons Charles (1997) „Structuralism and the concept of set“, In: E. Agazzi & G. Darvas (eds.), Philosophy of mathematics today, Dordrecht, Springer, 171–194.