Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

Buch | Kapitel

184114

Phenomenology of law

Vincent W. Lloyd

pp. 145-172

Abstrakt

Law is what is done. More precisely, law is what it is possible to do. A law is what one does: in these circumstances, these are the things to do. All of what it is possible for me to do is who I am. I am constituted by law, by laws. But those laws vary in their centrality to who I am. That I have two legs is more central to who I am than that I can play chess; that I can play chess is more central to who I am than that I know the meaning of "thalassemia.' I would still be who I am if I was legless or never learned how to play chess or never learned the meaning of "thalassemia.' The unity of who I am is not affected by laws; it is guaranteed by law. Laws are how I try to represent law, but their attempts inevitably fall short.

Publication details

Published in:

Lloyd Vincent W. (2009) Law and transcendence: on the unfinished project of Gillian Rose. Dordrecht, Springer.

Seiten: 145-172

DOI: 10.1057/9780230294196_7

Referenz:

Lloyd Vincent W. (2009) Phenomenology of law, In: Law and transcendence, Dordrecht, Springer, 145–172.