The anti-positivist methodological reflection in historical studies was marked above all by denial and scepticism. That scepticism had three aspects. Anti-positivist ideas were born out of doubts concerning the cognitive values of inductive cumulation of facts, i.e., analytical cognition. It was doubted, with much justification, whether human knowledge of the past events increases in proportion to the number of established facts. In the birth of that new reflection no less important role was played by scepticism about the positivist idea of an incessant evolution of man's intellectual and moral values, an evolution which was supposed to follow natural laws of progress that work regardless of facts; thus, this form of scepticism pertained to the very existence of such laws. Finally, scepticism about the optimistic treatment of historiography as a discipline which closely resembles the natural sciences and about the correctness of the principle of "objective"historiography dissociated from practical requirements also had a strong impact on anti-positivist reflection.