The title of this chapter alludes to Musgrave's piece "The Ultimate Argument for Realism", though the expression is van Fraassen's (1980, 39), and the argument is Putnam's (1975, 73): realism "is the only philosophy of science that does not make the success of science a miracle". Hence, the code name "no-miracles' argument (henceforth, NMA). The NMA has quite a history and a variety of formulations. I have documented all this in my work (Psillos 1999, Chapter 4). No matter how exactly the argument is presented, its thrust is that the success of scientific theories lends credence to the following two theses: (a) scientific theories should be interpreted realistically and (b) so interpreted, these theories are approximately true. The original authors of the argument, however, did not put an extra stress on novel predictions, which, as Musgrave (1988) makes plain, is the litmus test for the ability of any approach to science to explain the success of science.