Brentano's concept of mind
underlying nature, reference-fixing, and the mark of the mental
pp. 197-228
Abstrakt
Perhaps the philosophical thesis most commonly associated with Brentano is that intentionality is the mark of the mental. But in fact Brentano often and centrally uses also what he calls "inner perception" to demarcate the mental. In this chapter, I offer a new interpretation of Brentano's conception of the interrelations among mentality, intentionality, and inner perception. According to this interpretation, Brentano took the concept of mind to be a natural-kind concept, with intentionality constituting the underlying nature of the mental and inner-perceivability serving as the concept's reference-fixer.
Publication details
Published in:
Lapointe Sandra, Pincock Christopher (2017) Innovations in the history of analytical philosophy. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
Seiten: 197-228
DOI: 10.1057/978-1-137-40808-2_7
Referenz:
Kriegel Uriah (2017) „Brentano's concept of mind: underlying nature, reference-fixing, and the mark of the mental“, In: S. Lapointe & C. Pincock (eds.), Innovations in the history of analytical philosophy, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 197–228.