Other things equal, the chances improve
pp. 259-273
Abstrakt
The world, or rather that part of it with which we are acquainted, exhibits as we must all agree a good deal of regularity of succession. I contend that over and above that it exhibits no feature called causal necessity, but that we make sentences called causal laws… and [we] say that a fact asserted in a proposition which is an instance of causal law is a case of causal necessity (p. 160).
Publication details
Published in:
Marion Mathieu, Cohen Robert S (1995) Québec studies in the philosophy of science, part I: logic, mathematics, physics and history of science essays in honor of hugues Leblanc. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 259-273
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-1575-6_15
Referenz:
Pietroski Paul M. (1995) „Other things equal, the chances improve“, In: M. Marion & R.S. Cohen (eds.), Québec studies in the philosophy of science, part I, Dordrecht, Springer, 259–273.