In constructivism, dualisms of self-identical entities are inherent, a presupposition that has detrimental effects on the ways in which we understand and theorize knowing and learning. But any duality—body–mind, agent/mind–world, practice–theory—is the result of theory (theorizing activity) not the origin of theory. Drawing on the examples provided in chapters 2–4, I show how and when the separation of the cognizing agent and the material body/world occurs. I also draw on a study that described the emergence of the first pulsar observed to become an independent Galilean object in the course of one night's work in an astronomical observatory. I show how at the level of the individual, Maine de Biran's and M. Henry's philosophy provides an explanation of how the world observed comes to be experienced as independent of the observer. Language, accountability, and most of all radical passivity are integral to this emergence of the dualisms.