Buch | Kapitel
Epistemic replacement relativism defended
pp. 165-175
Abstrakt
In this paper I shall offer a response to Paul Boghossian's recent criticism of "replacement relativism". Replacement relativism is the main semantic strategy for making sense of philosophical forms of relativism. Replacement relativism was first formulated by Gilbert Harman (1996a, b). It models philosophical relativism on relativization in the natural sciences.
Publication details
Published in:
Surez Mauricio, Dorato Mauro, Rédei Miklós (2010) Epsa epistemology and methodology of science: launch of the European philosophy of science association. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 165-175
DOI: 10.1007/978-90-481-3263-8_14
Referenz:
Kusch Martin (2010) „Epistemic replacement relativism defended“, In: M. Surez, M. Dorato & M. Rédei (eds.), Epsa epistemology and methodology of science, Dordrecht, Springer, 165–175.