The scepticism of George Santayana
pp. 51-57
Abstrakt
Enough time has now elapsed since the death of George Santayana in 1952 for scholars to have gained the distance necessary for an objective evaluation of his contribution to philosophy. Santayana is no longer a flesh and blood contemporary whose polemic can be followed in the latest journal or in a steady stream of books; now he is a figure in the history of American thought whose importance can only be gauged by the positions he adopted and the intellectual movements with which he associated himself. If current philosophical scholarship be indicative of an ultimate assessment of Santayana's position, then it is as an epistemologist that he will be remembered. Recent critical articles by Jerome Ashmore, John Lachs, and Andrew Reck stand as indications of this scholarly trend.1
Publication details
Published in:
Cormier Ramona, Feibleman James K., Lee Harold N., Sallis John, Weiss Donald H. (1969) Epistemology II. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 51-57
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-3197-4_3
Referenz:
Gross Sidney A. (1969) The scepticism of George Santayana, In: Epistemology II, Dordrecht, Springer, 51–57.