Propositions as meanings of sentences
pp. 101-123
Abstrakt
In the preceding chapter I approached propositions by way of philosophical psychology, defining propositions as the objects of belief. But a thorough analysis led us to lend credit to the view that "the subject x believes the proposition p" can be analyzed as "x is ready to assent to the sentence s which means that p" or "x entertains a belief-content b which class="EmphasisTypeItalic ">represents p".
Publication details
Published in:
Gochet Paul (1980) Outline of a nominalist theory of propositions: an essay in the theory of meaning and in the philosophy of logic. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 101-123
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-8949-8_8
Referenz:
Gochet Paul (1980) Propositions as meanings of sentences, In: Outline of a nominalist theory of propositions, Dordrecht, Springer, 101–123.