It could be said that, whereas Kant's conception of natural necessity is essentially one of objective temporal succession among sensory representations, Bhaskar founds his transcendental realist conception of natural necessity and critique of empirical realism by investigating the conditions under which an objective temporal succession is in fact cognitively significant for natural science and the nature of causality that those conditions entail. Or, put differently, if the crux of Kant's Second Analogy is that a necessary temporal order is a condition for the representation of objects, then Bhaskar could be said to be reopening the question of what the ultimate objects of which knowledge is at stake in the cognitively significant experience of a necessary temporal order actually are. This inquiry takes the form of a transcendental analysis of experimental activity, in which the conditions that make experimental activity an intelligible activity are proposed in a form that validates transcendental realism and invalidates empirical realism. Note that the selection of experimental activity for transcendental analysis is strategic. From early modern philosophy to present-day philosophy of science, experimentation has been almost universally recognized as an epistemically decisive facet of natural science, and so any philosophy of science should reasonably be expected to accommodate it. Furthermore, that experimentation is relatively independent from any particular scientific theory is evidenced by the fact that it has been used to support and undermine many different theories.