Many of nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophy's most influential figures, such as Fichte, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, and Sellars, have positioned themselves in relation to Kant and claimed some part of the Kantian legacy, even if they have shown more reverence to (their own respective and often mutually incompatible interpretations of) the 'spirit" of Kant's philosophy rather than the "letter", to use Fichte's expression.¹ More recently, post-analytic philosophers like Robert Brandom² and John McDowell³ have rehabilitated certain general aspects of Kantianism in their work, while other Anglophone philosophers from P.F. Strawson⁴ to Robert Hanna⁵ have sought to introduce the doctrines of Kant's theoretical philosophy to debates in contemporary epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of science. To be sure, Kantianism is rich and multifaceted enough to inspire such diverse appropriations. Nevertheless, all of the above philosophers have had to take a stand, even if it is only implicit, on the question of what parts of Kant's philosophy should be currently upheld and what parts should be left to the past. In so doing, such philosophers define in their own ways what it means to have a Kantian heritage and the manner in which Kant has determined the scope of legitimate options available to subsequent philosophy.