Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

Series | Buch | Kapitel

203115

Truth, fallibility and the growth of knowledge

Isaac Levi

pp. 153-174

Abstrakt

According to a familiar story, beliefs qualify as knowledge only if they can be justified on the basis of impeccable first premisses via equally immaculate first principles. The story has no truth to it. Centuries of criticism suggest that our interesting beliefs are born on the wrong side of the blanket.

Publication details

Published in:

Cohen Robert S, Wartofsky Mark W (1983) Language, logic and method. Dordrecht, Springer.

Seiten: 153-174

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-7702-0_5

Referenz:

Levi Isaac (1983) „Truth, fallibility and the growth of knowledge“, In: R.S. Cohen & M.W. Wartofsky (eds.), Language, logic and method, Dordrecht, Springer, 153–174.