Truth, fallibility and the growth of knowledge
pp. 153-174
Abstrakt
According to a familiar story, beliefs qualify as knowledge only if they can be justified on the basis of impeccable first premisses via equally immaculate first principles. The story has no truth to it. Centuries of criticism suggest that our interesting beliefs are born on the wrong side of the blanket.
Publication details
Published in:
Cohen Robert S, Wartofsky Mark W (1983) Language, logic and method. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 153-174
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DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-7702-0_5
Referenz:
Levi Isaac (1983) „Truth, fallibility and the growth of knowledge“, In: R.S. Cohen & M.W. Wartofsky (eds.), Language, logic and method, Dordrecht, Springer, 153–174.