On the social side of self-knowledge
pp. 148-160
Abstrakt
Philosophical conceptions of introspection and self-knowledge typically emphasize first-person access to one's own mind, an orientation which we have analyzed in various ways throughout this book. More recent philosophical and scientific work emphasizes third-person objectivity which I have also brought into the mix to provide a more accurate and well-rounded understanding of introspection, as well as to mitigate some of the over-inflated epistemic privilege that has been granted to the first-person perspective, especially in Cartesian approaches to the mind. However, self-knowledge involves second-person interpersonal processes as well, through social interactions in which epistemic agents learn about themselves from others. The second-person stance is often not considered in philosophical and scientific work on the mind, though some have made efforts to give it more attention (e.g., Thompson, 2001; Ratcliffe, 2007, pp. 152–185). This chapter establishes a framework for bringing second-person social interaction into our understanding of introspection and self-knowledge. In particular, I will look at how substantial components of self-knowledge are acquired through social navigation and interpersonal testimony, via an agent's ability to navigate her position in social environments through what others say to her.
Publication details
Published in:
Butler Jesse (2013) Rethinking introspection: a pluralist approach to the first-person perspective. Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
Seiten: 148-160
Referenz:
Butler Jesse (2013) On the social side of self-knowledge, In: Rethinking introspection, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 148–160.