The burden of proof
pp. 123-130
Abstrakt
Suppose platonists could counter my causal objections and demonstrate that it is possible for us to have knowledge of acausal objects. This would still not establish the platonist position. First, I argue that the burden of proof is on platonists to explain how we do have such knowledge. Then I examine platonist attempts to provide such an explanation. I show that they are inadequate.
Publication details
Published in:
Cheyne Colin (2001) Knowledge, cause, and abstract objects: causal objections to Platonism. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 123-130
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-9747-0_8
Referenz:
Cheyne Colin (2001) The burden of proof, In: Knowledge, cause, and abstract objects, Dordrecht, Springer, 123–130.