Positivism offered a sense of security that a psychology founded firmly on data and the logic of inductive inference gives definite answers. In the post-positivist era, arguments against foundationist epistemology are shaking that confidence. Constructionism and hermeneutics, the two prime contenders for metatheory in the post-positivist era, add to this shake up since they are suspected of idealism and relativism. While a constructed reality seems a mere fabrication, hermeneutic "truths' are admittedly contingent on preunderstanding, and are always open to reinterpretation. Protagonists of constructionism tend not to suggest limits to relativism, and often invoke among their listeners a strong emotional response as if they are being rudely awakened from a positivist slumber and are suddenly thrown into a Feyerabendian anarchy. This paper argues that there is no need to let the pendulum swing from rock hard foundationism to a relativist quicksand, and suggests the possibility of finding a middle ground.