Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

Series | Buch | Kapitel

223584

Truth

Jaroslav Peregrin

pp. 106-121

Abstrakt

In the previous two chapters we discussed the possibilities and limitations of approaches to capturing necessary truth. Are there some analogous ways of capturing truth simpliciter? After all, necessary truth seems to be a subspecies, a special case of truth — is not every account for necessary truth thus a special case of a general theory, which would yield truth simpliciter as another special case?

Publication details

Published in:

Peregrin Jaroslav (1995) Doing worlds with words: formal semantics without formal metaphysics. Dordrecht, Springer.

Seiten: 106-121

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-8468-5_6

Referenz:

Peregrin Jaroslav (1995) Truth, In: Doing worlds with words, Dordrecht, Springer, 106–121.