Sense, force, and tone. As Dummett puts it, these are the three "ingredients' that Frege recognizes as belonging to our ordinary conception of linguistic meaning. That Frege himself does not put it quite this way warrants no splitting of hairs. He evidently never employs a word for our intuitive notion of meaning, reserving the German word Bedeutung for a more specialized use associated with the object referred to, or meant. From his earliest writings Frege explicitly acknowledges that there is indeed more to natural language, to its sentences in particular, than the expression of truth-evaluable thoughts and the force with which they are uttered. In Begriffsschrift he says that one can perceive a slight difference in meaning¹ between the sentences "At Platea the Greeks defeated the Persians' and "At Platea the Persians were defeated by the Greeks", a difference he attributes to the relative importance of subject or object to the interests of the speaker or hearer (1879: §3).