In previous chapters, I discussed Wittgenstein's Tractarian views about the inexpressibility of propositions of value, and I tried to highlight the implications of this radical, though prima facie defensible, view for issues of life's meaning. While in Chapter 1, I focused more on giving a broad picture of the Tractarian account of meaning in life, in Chapter 2 I tried to analyse some key views of naturalists and supernaturalists from a Tractarian perspective. Whereas most supernaturalists take the expressibility of their theories for granted, Wittgenstein draws attention to the limits of theory and justification. Furthermore, by discussing Singer's account of "ethical life", I raised objections to the justificatory nature of his account of "ethical life". I argued that even when these justificatory arguments are accepted as valid, they are unlikely to be successful in bringing about a change in my attitude and my "way of seeing the world", an issue that should concern philosophers. This is why I have dedicated this chapter to a discussion of "aspect-seeing" and "attitude" and exploring their various implications.