Zeitschrift | Band | Artikel
Hume, Goodman and radical inductive skepticism
pp. 2791-2813
Abstrakt
Goodman concurs in Hume’s contention that no theory has any probability relative to any set of data, and offers two accounts, compatible with that contention, of how some inductive inferences are nevertheless justified. The first, framed in terms of rules of inductive inference, is well known, significantly flawed, and enmeshed in Goodman’s unfortunate entrenchment theory and view of the mind as hypothesizing at random. The second, framed in terms of characteristics of inferred theories rather than rules of inference, is less well known, but provides a compelling view of inductive justification. Once the two accounts are clearly delineated, one can see that both are driven by a single deep conviction: that inductive justification can only be understood in terms of our actual inductive practice.
Publication details
Published in:
(2014) Synthese 191 (12).
Seiten: 2791-2813
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-014-0417-2
Referenz:
Johnsen Bredo (2014) „Hume, Goodman and radical inductive skepticism“. Synthese 191 (12), 2791–2813.