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Weak bayesian coherentism
pp. 337-346
Abstrakt
Recent results in probability theory have cast doubt on coherentism, purportedly showing (a) that coherence among a set of beliefs cannot raise their probability unless individual beliefs have some independent credibility, and (b) that no possible measure of coherence makes coherence generally probability-enhancing. I argue that coherentists can reject assumptions on which these theorems depend, and I derive a general condition under which the concurrence of two information sources lacking individual credibility can raise the probability of what they report.
Publication details
Published in:
Olsson Erik J. (2007) Coherence and truth. Synthese 157 (3).
Seiten: 337-346
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9059-3
Referenz:
Huemer Michael (2007) „Weak bayesian coherentism“. Synthese 157 (3), 337–346.