Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

Zeitschrift | Band | Artikel

236745

Bundling Hume with Kripkenstein

Michael Levin

pp. 35-64

Abstrakt

It is argued that the intuition driving Kripke’s famous version of Wittgenstein’s meaning skepticism is precisely the one that prompted Hume to despair of his bundle theory of the self: there are no necessary connections between distinct mental states. This interpretation is shown to throw light on Wittgenstein’s notorious idea that all proofs “create concepts.”

Publication details

Published in:

(2007) Synthese 155 (1).

Seiten: 35-64

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-005-2420-0

Referenz:

Levin Michael (2007) „Bundling Hume with Kripkenstein“. Synthese 155 (1), 35–64.