Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

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237013

Alethic functionalism and our folk theory of truth

M. P. Lynch

pp. 29-43

Abstrakt

According to alethic functionalism, truth is a higher-order multiply realizable property of propositions. After briefly presenting the view’s main principles and motivations, I defend alethic functionalism from recent criticisms raised against it by Cory Wright. Wright argues that alethic functionalism will collapse either into deflationism or into a view that takes “true” as simply ambiguous. I reject both claims.

Publication details

Published in:

(2005) Synthese 145 (1).

Seiten: 29-43

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-004-1771-2

Referenz:

Lynch M. P. (2005) „Alethic functionalism and our folk theory of truth“. Synthese 145 (1), 29–43.