Among the many tasks that phenomenology since its frst inception (and perhaps beyond) sets out to accomplish is to provide foundations for the sciences. Foundation should here be understood in a twofold sense: both that of the ontological foundation of the sciences and that of the foundation of transcendental nature. In the former case, the foundational concern is with delimiting the ontological spheres within which the empirical research moves, clarifying the mode of being and the nature of the essential structures that characterize it as well as the foundational relations between the various regions of being (nature, mind, subjective and objective spirit). One could think in this context of Husserl of course, but also of the paradigmatic signifcance of Edith Stein’s early writings with their attempts to ground and clarify the ontological-essential realms of psychology and historiography.
For many phenomenologists beginning with Husserl, of course, the ontological foundation cannot dispense with the transcendental one. The two must be kept distinct and yet can be neither separated nor detached from one another. The (ontological) delimitation of the diferent spheres and regions of being cannot be achieved except upon the basis of the phenomenological-transcendental investigation of their modes of constitution. One could also think, for example, of Oskar Becker’s work on the foundation of geometry and modal logic, of Jacob Klein’s work on the historicity of the foundation of mathematics, of the attempt undertaken by Tomoo Otaka to transcendentally ground the science of juridical-social formations, or, last but not least, of the “Copernican” turn in sociology that is proposed by Gerda Walther.
It is clear, however, that the problem of the foundation of the sciences goes hand in hand with the question of the very nature of philosophy and its transcendental scope. What idea of philosophy imposes itself as necessary for it to be able to ground ontologically as well as transcendentally the sciences, from the science of nature to jurisprudence, from psychology to anthropology, from the sciences of religion to historiography, mathematics and even formal logic? Consider, in this case, the grandiose attempt undertaken by Heidegger to rebuild the very transcendental conception of phenomenology on the basis of the existential analytic, and through this to also radically recast the problem of the foundation of the sciences. In Heidegger’s wake, one can think again of Becker’s work on mathematical existence, of the attempt made by the young Karl Löwith to rethink philosophical anthropology as well as of the early Marcuse’s attempts at grounding in the analytic of Dasein the science of historical materialism (and its critique of traditional economic science’s understanding of labor). But also the cases of Eugen Fink and Ludwig Landgrebe cannot be ignored with their attempts to rethink the nature of the transcendental and the very idea of constitution.
We invite papers from scholars working in the phenomenological tradition and in problems of the articulation of the relation between the ontological and the transcendental foundations of the sciences (broadly construed). More specifcally, contributions are encouraged to explore some of the following sets of concepts-problems-ideas:
• The concept of transcendental philosophy and how it develops in the phenomenological
tradition in connection to the foundation of science
• The problem of phenomenological idealism in connection with that of the idea of philosophy
• The diference/relationship between the ontological and transcendental foundation
• The idea of (phenomenological) philosophy and the sciences loosely construed (from the
science of nature to the Geisteswissenschaften, from psychology to aesthetics and historiography,
from biology and mathematics to logic, sociology, and even Marxism/dialectical materialism)
• The notion of phenomenological-transcendental foundation
• Transcendental Phenomenology and the methodological relevance of the of life-world
(ontology of the life-world) in connection with the foundation of science
• Transcendental Phenomenology and the problem of the (material) a priori
• The problem whether phenomenology should provide an (ontological and/or transcendental)
foundation for the sciences or only clarify their (basic) concepts and assumptions
Abstracts and papers must be submitted to the following e-mail addresses: firstname.lastname@example.org
Submitted papers (in English, German, French, Spanish or Italian) must follow the basic principles of Metodo and follow all Author Guidelines. The editorial board highly suggests all authors writing in a non-native language to have their texts proofread before submission. All contributions will undergo anonymous peer-review by two referees.
The fnal deadline for submissions will be November 30, 2024.