As is well known, sense-bestowal (Sinngebung) is a fundamental concept in Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Husserl considers that everything, including nonsense or absurdity, is a result of consciousness’ production of sense. In the following article, I will argue against this thesis. More precisely, I claim that there are experiences that are not characterised by sense-bestowal. These experiences, which, in my view, are directly related to Husserl’s concept of limit-phenomena, can be called sense-withdrawal experiences. In order to show this, the paper has the following structure: First, I will analyse the highly nuanced concept of sense-bestowal, drawing connections to the notion of constitution. Second, I will introduce the concept of limit-phenomena, which I will interpret in terms of sense-refusing experiences. This, in turn, will enable me to delve into the concept of sense-withdrawal, which will serve as the focal point of the final segment of the paper.