1The following work originated as a reaction to a variety of objections the author heard in many discussions with non-phenomenologists, objections that were leveled at the phenomenological method and against the phenomenological conceptions of the essence of something and of ideal entities. Hence, the principal goal of the treatise is a deeper grounding of the phenomenological position on these topics. This grounding must lead through a more detailed treatment of relevant issues on the one hand, as well as deal polemically with some frequently aired views on the other. As such, the work is addressed primarily to non-phenomenologists. Consequently, it must assume as little as possible about phenomenological notions, and take the greatest possible care in the employment of phenomenological jargon. For this reason, some of what follows may appear superfluous to a reader versed in phenomenology.
2It seems to me, on the other hand, that even phenomenologists might derive some benefit from reading this work. Various points that have not yet been dealt with in the extant literature on phenomenology had to be worked out in order to substantiate the position defended here. At the same time, it would seem to me that reflecting on the fundamental themes and difficulties of phenomenology is not as insignificant in the current situation as may perhaps appear to some researchers, who, by recklessly storming ahead, would like to conquer for phenomenology ever new and increasingly inaccessible frontiers – as if the analysis of essence were the easiest of all research enterprises, and as if all dangers that threaten phenomenology from various quarters had already been eliminated.
3I dedicate this work to my dear friend Władysław Witwicki, Professor at Warsaw University, whose challenges to my positions gave me occasion to think through anew matters that I had previously deemed settled. – The Author