§18. The Determinative Judgment as Answer to the Question “What is that?”

1<84>In his textbook on logic, A. Pfänder divides judgments according to the kinds of states of affairs that comprise their objects. He partitions all judgments into (1) judgments whose object comprises a state of affairs that resides within the object-correlate of the subject-term [S-G]1 of the judgment and into (2) the so-called “judgments of relation” [Relationsurteile]. And he further splits the first class of judgments into three subclasses: (a) “determinative judgments”; (b) “attributive judgments”; and (c) “existential judgments”.2 Pfänder calls the members of sub-class a) ‘determinative judgments’ “because they determine the object-correlate of the subject-term [S-G] by adducing its ‘What’.” They answer the question “What is that?”. Attributive judgments, on the other hand, answer the question “How is that?”3 by indicating some property of the object-correlate of the subject-term [S-G]. Existential judgments [Existentialurteile], finally, answer the question concerning the mode of existence of that object-correlate (cf. ib 186-7).

2The question arises4 as to what Pfänder actually understands by a determinative judgment. That is to say, when this term is first introduced, we are led to believe that it is to be understood only as a judgment of the type “That is an X”. We later learn, however, that the judgment “Gold is a metal” is also to be included among these judgments (ib 322). Meanwhile, the last-named judgment is not an answer to the question “What is that?”, but rather to the question “What is gold?”. The muddle we sense here is occasioned either by Pfänder’s not having become aware of the difference among the questions we have contrasted, or because some other reason is decisive for including the judgment “Gold is a metal” among the determinative judgments.5 Without engaging here in a debate with Pfänder, we merely note6 that by a determinative judgment we understand only a judgment like “That is a square”. In contrast, a judgment like “The square, that is a parallelogram with congruent sides and right angles” we term a “judgment pertaining to essence” [Wesensurteil],7 and we shall deal with it in our next chapter. As will presently become apparent, our characterization of a determinative judgment is narrower than Pfänder’s also for another reason. <85> By a determinative judgment in our sense, we understand only the kind of judgment whose predicate-term grasps the object-correlate of the subject-term [S-G] by means of its individual constitutive nature.8

3Pfänder claims that the determinative judgment determines the object-correlate of the subject-term [S-G] by indicating its “What”. He asserts at the same time (and we concur with him) that a peculiar unity subsists between this object’s “What” and the object itself, which is completely different from, say, the unity between an object and any of its properties. In conclusion, he adds:

Accordingly, in the determinative judgments the copula performs not only that assertoric general drawing-into-coordination [Hinordnung] of the predicate-determination with the object-correlate of the subject-term [S-G] – as ordinarily expressed by the word ‘is’ in the paradigm for the judgment in general – but posits at the same time that material [sachliche] unity which obtains between the object and its “What”. (ib 186, my [R.I.] emphasis)

4Our analyses in §7 have led us to a somewhat different conception. We said there: “When we say: ‘That is a dachshund’, we are asserting identity between the object-correlate of the subject-term [S-G], intended in a way that ignores its nature [‘That’], and that same object intended in the predicate-term from the perspective of its constitutive individual nature [‘dachshund’]. And in making this assertion, we are implicitly disclosing the individual nature by means of which the respective object is constituted.”9 In saying this, we are in complete agreement with Pfänder that in a judgment of the sort just mentioned the word ‘is’ performs an entirely different function than e.g. in the attributive judgment “This board is black”. At the same time, however, our characterization of this function is more accurate when we refer to it as the function of identifying the object-correlate of the subject-term [S-G] with the correlate of the predicate-term. We are merely contesting that in the case at hand the predicate designates what Pfänder calls the object’s “What”, or – more narrowly,10 and in our terminology – that it signifies the individual constitutive nature of the object-correlate of the subject-term [S-G]. When we say: “That is a dachshund” or “That is a square”, we understand by “a dachshund “, “a square”, not – sit venia verbo – the “dachshundness”, or the “squareness” (not even if the latter are taken to designate individual moments of individual objects, <86> i.e. the immediate morphe in Hering’s terminology, or the individual constitutive nature in ours), but rather, something that is constituted by this “dachshundness” [or “squareness”]. We readily concede that a peculiar unity obtains between the “squareness” and the “square”, between the “dachshundness” and a “dachshund”, not comparable to the relation between the object and one of the characteristics that accrues to it. But the function of the word ‘is’ in the given judgments does not refer to this unity – indeed, it implicite presupposes it. The function of this word resides in identifying the entities in question. It is precisely because the unity between the “What” and the object itself is so peculiarly tight and indissoluble, and because – in concert with this – the object’s individual constitutive nature is something that could not exist realiter for itself (without the subject, the “bearer”), that we can do nothing other than endorse the above identity. If we point out some individual object with the word ‘that’ and ask about something that concerns this object, then the answer contained in the predicate of the judgments discussed here must also refer to precisely this same individual, somehow constituted, object – and not to some moment which by its very essence is non-selfsufficient. This does not of course rule out that in saying “That is a square”11 we are indirectly also adducing what kind of nature constitutes “that”, and that by doing so, we specify the object more precisely. And this also does not preclude our employing the determinative judgment as answer to the question “What is that?”, precisely because such a judgment informs us indirectly about the nature of the respective object. At any rate, the judgments “That is a square” and “That is constituted by the individual nature ‘squareness’” do not have the same meaning, though they are undoubtedly equivalent.

5The condition for the truth of a concrete determinative judgment is the objective subsistence of the identity asserted in it. Consequently, it belongs among the formal presuppositions of this judgment that there is at all something like an object’s individual constitutive nature. Apropos this last point, we encounter a mode of reasoning which – if it were right – would have to subvert our standpoint <87> with regard to both the essence of determinative judgments and the question “What is that?”. The judgment “That is a dachshund” would then have to be regarded as an incorrect expression of the fact that we reckon the object-correlate of the subject-term [S-G] into some class of objects, depending on our momentary interest. The distinction between the question “What is that?” and the “schema-question” would also be indirectly erased as a result. We are therefore compelled to examine this mode of reasoning in somewhat greater detail.

§19. Skeptical Conception of the Individual Constitutive Nature of the Object

6The line of reasoning we need to examine here can be summarized as follows: if it is true that there is something like an object’s individual constitutive nature – that is, if there is something that dictates what the given object is – then every individual object has one and only one constitutive nature. Further, one can issue a whole series of true judgments concerning one and the same individual object all of which appear to proffer its “What”: “That is an eagle”, “That is a bird of prey”, “That is a beast”, “That is a living creature”, “That is a material object”, etc.12 Therefore, either all of the cited judgments are true, in which case the conception of the constitutive nature of an object we have advanced must be false, or this conception is true, and then all these judgments with the exception of a single one are false. But which would then be this lucky exception? Now since the possibility of the truth of each of these judgments is certainly beyond doubt, and since at the same time there is no criterion that would enable us to select from amongst them that allegedly sole true one and brand the rest as false, the conception of the constitutive nature of the individual object must be false. Therefore, either one cannot speak at all about an object’s constitutive nature, or one must regard it as a subjective mode of apprehension. In the latter case, we are merely left with the psychological problem of why and how such subjective modes of apprehension have arisen, which suggests the notion, frequently expressed in modern literature, that practical factors have played a crucial role in that process.13

§20. The Incorrectness of the Advanced Conception

7The skeptical conception of the individual object’s constitutive nature set forth in the preceding section rests on a false premise and is therefore itself completely wrong, indeed – as could be shown – countersensical. Eliminating this premise allows us on the one hand to defend the claim that all of the judgments listed above can be right, and on the other hand to retain our position as regards the nature of an object. The premise at issue alleges that all these judgments are determinative judgements in the sense we have advanced, i.e. that the predicate-term in each of them intends the object-correlate of the subject-term [S-G] by means of its individual constitutive nature. Yet this is not the case, insofar as the word ‘that’ designates one and the same individual object in each of these judgments. We wish to demonstrate the incorrectness of this premise with the aid of an example in which we have at our disposal concepts that are more precise than the zoological. Toward that end we take an example from plane geometry and juxtapose the following set of judgments in which the word ‘that’ is always meant to designate one and the same individual object: (1) That is a square; (2) That is a parallelogram; (3) That is a quadrilateral; (4) That is a polygon. All four of these judgments are true if, as we presuppose, the first one is. If, however, the nth judgment were true, then not all of the judgments from (1) through (n-1) would have to be true. Only the first of these judgments is a determinative judgment in our sense, for only in that one does the predicate-term intend an object by means of its individual constitutive nature. If, in contrast, we say “That is a parallelogram”, the predicate-term of this judgment does indeed also intend an object, but it does so <89> through an apprehension of just one particular moment of its individual constitutive nature – something which is incapable of constituting an individual object on its own. This is already suggested by the fact to which we have just alerted the reader: the truth of the judgment “That is a parallelogram” does not at all need to be accompanied by the truth of the judgment “That is a square”, for there is a whole series of judgments that could just as well be true. Or to put it another way: the “parallelogramness”, taken idealiter – though not in the sense of an ideal quality, but rather in the sense of an element in the meaning-content of a corresponding idea – forms in the concretization the immediate morphe of the content-core of the idea14 “the square”, or the immediate morphe of the meaning-content of the general15 idea “the parallelogram”, but it can form the immediate morphe of the meaning-content neither of the particular idea “the square” nor of any other particular idea. Its [“parallelogramness”] individual correlate in the region of individual objects cannot be the constitutive nature of any of these objects. It is doubly non-selfsufficient. To put it differently: there is no individual object that would be “a parallelogram” unless it were simultaneously a square, or a rhombus, or etc. Therefore, if the word ‘that’ designates an individual object, and one wished to interpret the judgment “That is a parallelogram” in the sense of a determinative judgment,16 then this judgment would be not only false but outright countersensical. However, if despite that we say that this judgment is true, that holds only because it is not any sort of determinative judgment in our sense – that is to say, because it does not ascertain identity between the object-correlate of the subject-term [S-G] and an object grasped by means of its individual constitutive nature. What, then, is the object17 of this judgment?

8In §11 we stated that whatever the core of the meaning-content of an idea is, it occurs as the immediate morphe of the content of the immediately more general idea. We can now say, conversely: if we pass from a general idea to increasingly less general, subordinate ideas, all the way to a corresponding particular idea, we find in the content of the particular idea all those moments that make up in the superordinate ideas the immediate morphe of the content of each of them. Since <90> the individual object is the instantiation of a particular idea, all those moments that occur in the content of that idea must be concretized (or realized) in it. For this reason, the “parallelogramness”, as well as the “quadrilateralness” etc., are unquestionably concretized in the individual object “this square”. They all belong to this object’s constitutive nature as its non-selfsufficient moments and they contribute to constituting it, and thereby to the constituting of the object itself. None of these moments (apart from the individual nature itself) is by itself capable of constituting an individual object; if, however, it does occur as non-selfsufficient moment in the constitutive nature, then it is capable of distinguishing the respective object from all other objects that do not fall under the given general idea. In everyday life, focused as it is on practical affairs, we are often not interested at all in what makes up the individual constitutive nature of an object, whereas what is important is what characterizes this object in contrast to others. We can then consider the given object in terms of [sub specie] one moment or another contained in its nature. This moment can serve us as a schema for apprehending the entire object, or, to put it better, we can employ it for constituting a schema that is merely a subjective mode of apprehending. When we grasp an object by means of such a schema, we provide that object with something like a new visage; we confer on that moment of the nature the role of a quasi-morphe of the respective object. We are then altogether justifiably entitled to say: “That is a parallelogram”; for the schema constituted by parallelogramness, which drapes itself over the object like some garment, is not deprived of its “fundamentum in re”.18 This judgment first becomes absurd if we apprehend the correlate of the predicate-term in the sense of a selfsufficient individual object constituted by a corresponding morphe, and let the word ‘is’ exercise the function of identifying. But neither the first nor the second is necessary. When this judgment is taken only as expression of ascertaining that “that” is being apprehended through a schema which is constituted by a moment belonging to the nature of an object, and which distinguishes this object from others, [that is,] when it registers the fact that the given object is being apprehended by reference to [sub specie] some moment <91> contained in its nature, and which is for some reasons conceived as being important to us – then this judgment will not be devoid of a rational sense. It will not only be true but will also not conflict with the judgment “That is a square”. But then, of course, one will not be able to regard it as a determinative judgment in our sense.

9One therefore cannot concoct out of the simultaneous truth of all the judgments at issue any counterargument against our position in regard to the individual constitutive nature.19

10However, the following thought readily comes to mind: the judgment “That is a parallelogram” takes the respective object as something in which the general idea “the parallelogram” is concretized and determines the object only through this fact. We do not wish to dispute that this judgment can also be interpreted in this sense. But then we do indeed assign to it a different meaning, one that is an answer to a different form of the schema-question – namely, to the question “What is that?”, interpreted in this [other] sense.20 For in the judgment, “That is a parallelogram”, which we discussed earlier, the issue is not the given object’s role as an individual concretizer of a general idea. Nor are we interested in this case in the relationship of the given object to some idea. It is perfectly sufficient for us to consider the object in question in and for itself – without regard to all ideas. We can pass the judgment “That is a parallelogram” in the sense discussed above once we have distinguished in the object a stratum constituted by the moment “the parallelogramness”, and utilize it as a schema for grasping the whole object – thus conferring on that object some especially telling feature. Insofar as in doing so the moment constituting the schema does actually belong among the moments that occur in the nature of the object, a truth has been told with that judgment – provided we do not forget that the corresponding moment is not the nature itself, that the schema is therefore not to be identified with the object itself. From here, a single solitary step leads to the judgment “That is a parallelogram” in the sense that it apprehends the object in question as a concretizer [Konkretisator] of the general idea “the parallelogram”. But, as we have already remarked above, this interpretation of the judgment presupposes the one initially discussed. Only because <92> the given object contains among its constituents the stratum constituted by the moment “the parallelogramness”, and because this stratum21 corresponds to the immediate morphe of the content of the general idea “the parallelogram”, is that object a concretizer of this idea. That is why we can apprehend the object in this role, and point to that role with the appropriately understood22 judgment “That is a parallelogram”. Both of these differing interpretations exclude this judgment from the class of determinative judgments in our sense.23

11In the final analysis, every individual object allows for being apprehended in manifold ways through a variety of schemas that form the discrete strata within the object, and which are employed by us for apprehending the object. This fact does not contradict in the least the existence of one and only one individual nature that constitutes the object – to the contrary, it presupposes such an individual nature wherever the nature is not an absolutely simple moment, and where the schema is not conditioned or constituted by a relation of the given object to other objects. In everyday living, and even in science, we are for the most part content with apprehending an object by means of such a schema. Ordinarily, however, this always happens whenever and for whatever reasons we are only interested in those moments of the respective object which in a given case we use for constituting the schema. But the instant we wish to cognize an individual object’s essence, we cannot remain satisfied with an apprehending by means of some schema, but must direct our attention to the individual nature, the cognition of which comprises the first necessary though insufficient step toward cognizing that essence. The profusion of instances in which we apprehend an object through some schema, and their obvious relation to the most diverse practical ends (and there are “practical” ends even within science!), has brought some researchers to the view that the schemas had only practical sense; the confusion of the schemas with the constitutive nature of an individual object has then led to the hasty conclusion that the constitutive nature is also merely a practical “category” that depends on the acting subject, a “category” that must be eliminated if at issue is a <93> disinterested, metaphysical cognition (see Bergson!). The unavoidable petitio principii in which such theories get tangled up affords the best proof that they are fundamentally wrong.24 We cannot go into this in greater detail here.

12Whether the cognition of its constitutive nature is possible in every single instance of dealing with an individual object, and what criteria there are for having succeeded to grasp the nature of the object in a given case – these are issues that fall within the realm of epistemology. The purely ontological problem to which we confine ourselves here relates exclusively to the separation of the constitutive nature of the object from the multifarious schemas that may be employed for apprehending it. This ontological distinction must be presupposed in order to arrive at the epistemological issues.

13Meanwhile, someone may reproach us with the following line of reasoning: “It may well be!” – so we may be told – “that there is a certain distinction between what is here called the object’s ‘constitutive nature’ and the schemas. But is it not ultimately up to us whether we ‘apprehend’ the object in this or that manner? Is it not better to simply say that we can form and transform various sorts of objects as we please, rather than get involved in difficult and convoluted analyses of how one and the same object is amenable to being apprehended by means of various schemas? Mathematics, and even to a certain degree physics, shows best that we are in fact free [to do so]; consider the theory of atomic structure and the so-called ‘models’. Why should we allow ourselves to be dazzled by the chimera of selfsufficiently existing objects – especially in mathematics? Why worry about the putative demands of ‘objective knowledge’? Science will fulfill its social and practical role regardless, provided we simply construct consistent systems that satisfy our sense of harmony. Need one, and should one, saddle science with other, greater demands, and can it satisfy all the pretensions of the philosophers? <94> Let us be unassuming, and then these various unintelligible ‘essences’, ‘natures’, ‘ideal qualities’, etc., will also vanish; then we shall be able to dispense with ‘scholastic sophistries’, and to eliminate dogmatic prejudices! Everything will then be transparent and clear and, what is even more important, everything will lie within the bounds of our freedom.”25

14It would appear that such views – following the ground-breaking works of Husserl – are today impossible. Yet, one will find this doctrine in very broad circles of both philosophically-minded mathematicians and mathematically-oriented natural scientists. Consequently, we could not overlook this line of reasoning with indifference.26 But since we shall also encounter an analogous argument when discussing the problems of the next chapter, we shall not examine it in detail until later. (cf. Ch. VI)

§ 21. Retrospective on the Question “What is that?”

15We are now in a position to settle definitively the problem of the ambiguity that afflicts the question “What is that?” It rests on the fact that the known elements of the problem do not unequivocally determine the unknown. We are best convinced that such is the case by the different kinds of answers that can be given to this question. We would now like to collate all the cases we have distinguished thus far, without meaning to claim in doing so that we have already exhausted all possibilities.

1. The wording of the question “What is that?” does not at all rule out that the questioner simply wishes to learn the name of the given object, and his being fully satisfied with a mere naming. By employing said question for this purpose, he is, strictly speaking, expressing himself incorrectly, but in fact this incorrectness occurs frequently. Yet in view of the fact that the name serves to designate the selfsufficiency and distinctiveness of the object, and should grasp the object through its constitutive nature, we can easily understand how the two questions – “What is that?” and “What is the name of that?” – have entered into such a tight reciprocal relation, and why the first is so often employed instead of the second. The misunderstandings that can arise from such an incorrect utilization of the question “What is that?” can be eliminated with relative ease. <95> However, the occasional seriousness of these misunderstandings is proven by those cases in which27 the person questioned reinterprets this question in the nominal sense, thereby transforming a [substantive] discussion into a purely terminological squabble, and making it for this reason commensurately inconsequential. The phenomenologists, in particular, have often enough had the experience of having their strictly substantive question readily distorted in this unfitting, nominalistic fashion – and of having their problem simply swept aside as a consequence.28 Conversely, there are cases of substantive problems being sought where only a point of terminology is at issue.
2. The question “What is that?” can also be asked with the sole objective of an unequivocal specification. Here we may get a whole host of answers that pertain to the very same object, all of which will be equally worthy as long as they satisfy the conditions we listed in Chapter III. Even the mere reporting of a name, especially a proper name, will suffice to this end, provided the name is familiar to the questioner. But one can also utilize here a determinative judgment in our sense.
3. Our question may also frequently have its basis in the intention to apprehend the given object by means of one of the schemas discussed in the previous section. In this case too many answers can be given, all in principle equally worthy, and the questioner has to instruct us by means of additional information which of them is actually the one of consequence to him. The number of these answers is constrained by the number of doubly non-selfsufficient morphes that are contained as moments in the given object’s constitutive nature. Thus, in order to come up with true answers here, it is necessary to investigate thoroughly the content of the respective particular idea, and to determine under which general ideas the object in question falls. That is to say, it is necessary to answer the question “The X, what is that?” after having ascertained that an X is involved in the case at hand. Consequently, we must concern ourselves with this question in greater detail.
4. But the possibility of investigating the corresponding particular idea presupposes that we have answered the question “What is that?” with a determinative judgment in our sense. The proper, or, if one prefers, the most important meaning <96> of the question “What is that?” is therefore the one in which the unknown of the problem is an individual object apprehended by means of its constitutive nature. In this case, there can be only one solitary answer to the question. In order to construct this answer, we have to cognize the given object in its essence, whereby first of all we have to pay attention to the distinction between the ποῖον εἶναι and the τί εἶναι, and to grasp intuitively the qualitative moment of the constitutive nature – as well as cognize that moment in its structure. We shall still have occasion to discuss this.
5. The meaning of the question “What is that?” that we have just discussed has to be contrasted with yet another meaning that is frequently confounded with it. At issue is that interpretation of the question in which it is utilized for the purposes of a classification. The unknown of the problem then relates to the role that the object plays as member of a class, or to the role that accrues to it by virtue of its occurrence as the term of some relationship to other entities. We have here a whole set of different sorts of answers, a set that is not surveyable as long as the purpose of the classification, or the constitutive moment of the class under consideration, has not been specified. The main danger to emerge from the ambiguity of the question “What is that?” has its source in confounding the meaning of the given question now discussed with the one set forth under (4).

Notes

• 1 [“resides within the object-correlate of the subject-term [S-G]” replaces “plays out within the framework of the object intended [domniemanego = vermeint] by the subject”. The reader is reminded that [S-G] symbolizes Subjektgegenstand, which we shall standardly render by the phrase ‘object-correlate of the subject-term’, even though, as in this instance, Ingarden translates it in a variety of more or less similar ways in P.]
• 2 [Bestimmungsurteile, Attributionsurteile, Seinsurteile, respectively. Ingarden employs Seinsurteile as synonymous to Existentialurteile (see last sentence of this paragraph).]
• 3 [We give here the literal translation of “Wie ist das?” – which has no colloquial counterpart in English.]
• 4 [“The question arises” replaces “Doubt arises as to whether this subdivision into three categories is sufficient. This is connected with a certain lack of clarity”.]
• 5 [“because some other…judgments” replaces “because some motive, undisclosed at the time of characterizing them [questions], influences including the judgment ‘Gold is a metal’ – or the ambiguity of determination contained in the word Was”]
• 6 [Cont. in P: “in order to avoid misunderstandings”]
• 7 [“judgment pertaining to essence” replaces “predicative judgment”]
• 8 [The preceding two sentences replace “For us, the judgment ‘Gold is a metal’ (‘The square is a parallelogram’) is likewise not a determinative judgment.”]
• 9 [Ingarden clearly does not mean for this to be a quote of the passage alluded to in §7 <28-9>. It is reproduced here for convenience: “…in the sentence… ‘That is a dachshund’… identity is asserted between the object-correlate of the subject-term [S-G], which is apprehended in a way that ignores its nature, and the object designated by the predicate-term, which is apprehended by way of its individual nature. In doing so, the individual nature by means of which the given object is constituted is at the same time conveyed implicite.”]
• 10 Pfänder’s concept of ‘What’ is, if we may put it this way, broader than our concept of the individual constitutive nature. We shall deal with this presently.
• 11 By “a square” is of course understood here not a particular idea, but an individual, ideal object falling under this idea. [This ftn. added in G]
• 12 This example stems from Pfänder, who recognizes the possibility of such a series of judgments pertaining to one and the same object. But Pfänder does not draw the conclusions laid out in our text because from the outset he takes the object’s “What” in a broader sense.
• 13 Bergson, as we know, holds the same position in considering the object’s “nature” as a practical action-oriented schema. See my work Intuition und Intellekt bei H. Bergson [Ingarden, 1922]. In Bergson, compare Le rire [Paris: Alcan, 1912, 25]. Let us note in passing that, apart from being victim to some other confusions, Bergson does not distinguish the nature from the essence. [Following [Ingarden, 1922], continues in P: “, in particular in the Chapter ‘Die äussere Wahrnehmung [External Perception]’, p. 323, on the schema of action”]
• 14 [“idea” replaces “general idea”]
• 15 [“general” replaces “more general”]
• 16 In our sense.
• 17 [“object” replaces “meaning”]
• 18 [Cont. in P: “, and it is impermissible to ascribe to it a being that is independent of the cognizing subject, nor to identify it with the object’s individual nature, or even with some kind of individual object”]
• 19 [This sentence added in G]
• 20 [These two sentences replace: “In our estimation, this view goes a step too far and pertains to the judgment ‘That is a parallelogram’. Meanwhile, these two judgments, though closely related, are nonetheless different.”]
• 21 [Cont. in P: “(= schema)”]
• 22 [“appropriately understood”: meaning, by taking ‘parallelogram’ in the instrumental case]
• 23 [This sentence added in G]
• 24 We have demonstrated this with respect to Bergson in the work cited earlier. [Cont. in P: “, in both of its critical chapters (ib 398-461)”]
• 25 [Cont. in P: “, and gaining awareness of this state of affairs will at the same time be a liberation from crude and pretentious biases”]
• 26 [These three opening sentences of the paragraph replace: “A line of reasoning very much in vogue today, and we cannot pass over it with indifference despite all its absurdity.”]
• 27 [Cont. in P: “we do not at all pose this question in the nominal sense, yet”]
• 28 [This sentence added in G]