Synthese

A case of confusing probability and confirmation

Jeanne Peijnenburg

Epistemic justification

Vol. 195/9

Grounds and limits

Jeanne Peijnenburg David Atkinson

Infinite regress in decision theory, philosophy of science, and formal epistemology

Vol. 191/4

Infinite regress in decision theory, philosophy of science, and formal epistemology

Jeanne Peijnenburg Sylvia Wenmackers

Introduction to the special issue

Jeanne Peijnenburg Branden FitelsonIgor Douven

Introduction to the special issue on epistemic justification

Benjamin BewersdorfJeanne Peijnenburg

Probability all the way up

David Atkinson Jeanne Peijnenburg

Probability as a theory dependent concept

David Atkinson Jeanne Peijnenburg

Probability, confirmation and fallacies

Vol. 184/1