Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

Series | Buch | Kapitel

147713

Noemata senses, and meanings

John Drummond(Fordham University)

pp. 171-201

Abstrakt

Previous chapters have argued for an interpretation of the concrete noema of an act as the object intended in that act just as it is intended. It was further argued that (i) this object is an identical objectivity presenting itself in a manifold of noematic phases, including the correlates of the momentary impressional phase and the phases horizonally (retentively and protentively, i.e. associatively) intended in the momentary phase. The horizonally intended phases can be brought to actual presence in the reproduction of prior phases and the generation of new phases through the temporal extension of the act As such, the object is intended both (concretely) in and (horizonally) through the noema. Consequently, (ii) the noema is neither ontologically distinct from the object nor simply identical with it. The noema is the object abstractly considered in its presentation to a conscious experience, i.e. as the objective correlate of that experience, as the object's significance for a knowing subject. Therefore, (iii) the noema is both the intended object just as intended and the objective sense of the experience.

Publication details

Published in:

Drummond John (1990) Husserlian intentionality and non-foundational realism. Dordrecht, Kluwer.

Seiten: 171-201

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-1974-7_8

Referenz:

Drummond John (1990) Noemata senses, and meanings, In: Husserlian intentionality and non-foundational realism, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 171–201.