Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

Series | Buch | Kapitel

148974

Intentionality, mentalism, and the problem of objective reference

Maurita Harney

pp. 11-36

Abstrakt

One consequence of Wittgenstein's celebrated arguments against the possibility of a private language has been the release of "the mental" from "mentalism".

Publication details

Published in:

Harney Maurita (1984) Intentionality, sense and the mind. Dordrecht, Springer.

Seiten: 11-36

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-1905-6_2

Referenz:

Harney Maurita (1984) Intentionality, mentalism, and the problem of objective reference, In: Intentionality, sense and the mind, Dordrecht, Springer, 11–36.