Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

Series | Buch | Kapitel

149047

Abstrakt

"This world, which I now experience as the present world with a perceptual belief that is continually and doubtlessly being confirmed, and which, on the basis of harmonious past experience, I experience as the past world with the indubitable empirical belief of memory — this world need not be more than a transcendental illusion."1 "In truth, there could be nothing real, no world, none ever having been or being now, while I nonetheless experience this [world] with certainty, and completely without doubt."2 What is the meaning of this claim? How does Husserl establish the possibility that the world could be a transcendental illusion? We will consider the question of meaning first.3

Publication details

Published in:

McKenna William R (1982) Husserl's "Introductions to phenomenology": interpretation and critique. Dordrecht, Springer.

Seiten: 184-220

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-7573-6_6

Referenz:

McKenna William R (1982) Transcendental illusion, In: Husserl's "Introductions to phenomenology", Dordrecht, Springer, 184–220.