Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

Series | Buch | Kapitel


On the theory of the theoretical attitude of the phenomenologist

what the epoché means and accomplishes

Edmund Husserl

pp. 296-315


Before I can further elucidate this disinterestedness, I have to first elucidate the more general phenomenon, which perhaps accompanies a splitting of the I, that of the ambiguity in belief and more generally in position-taking comportment, according to which, unlike the usual case, the reflecting I does not participate in the positiontaking of the lower I (indeed, even perhaps rejects it), at which it has directed itself in reflection.1 An example for this is the class="EmphasisTypeItalic ">Skeptic, who actively lives through his perceptual belief in a straightforward perspective on his | external world of perception in the harmony of his perceiving and cannot but, as a concordantly perceiving I, have these things and this world given as reality.

Publication details

Published in:

Husserl Edmund (2019) First philosophy: lectures 1923/24 and related texts from the manuscripts (1920-1925). Dordrecht, Springer.

Seiten: 296-315

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-024-1597-1_17


Husserl Edmund (2019) On the theory of the theoretical attitude of the phenomenologist: what the epoché means and accomplishes, In: First philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer, 296–315.