Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

Series | Buch | Kapitel

150445

The philosophical significance of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction

Edmund Husserl

pp. 365-390

Abstrakt

After having now carried out the new method of the transcendental reduction in its entirety and after having constructed it itself in a methodological ascent from its lower stratum of a merely phenomenological-psychological reduction, we may well say that it has enriched us enormously in this methodological grounding. Not only [is it the case] that the Cartesian reduction, based on the proof of the possible non-existence of the experienced world, had a direct but only limited result. Through the starting point of the non-existence of the experienced world it led our considerations to subjectivity, but only as experiencing and thereby as unaffected by this non-existence.

Publication details

Published in:

Husserl Edmund (2019) First philosophy: lectures 1923/24 and related texts from the manuscripts (1920-1925). Dordrecht, Springer.

Seiten: 365-390

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-024-1597-1_21

Referenz:

Husserl Edmund (2019) The philosophical significance of the transcendental-phenomenological reduction, In: First philosophy, Dordrecht, Springer, 365–390.