Deutsche Gesellschaft
für phänomenologische Forschung

Buch | Kapitel

178507

Specifically human?

the limited conception of self-consciousness in theories of reflective endorsement

Irene Bucelli

pp. 105-128

Abstrakt

Human beings act, and it is intuitive to think that they are agents in a rather unique way, one that is different from other animals. Human beings can act for reasons. In particular, human actions can be subject to normative considerations, raising the issue of whether one should or should not act in a certain way under certain circumstances.

Publication details

Published in:

Winkler Rafael (2016) Identity and difference: contemporary debates on the self. Dordrecht, Springer.

Seiten: 105-128

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-40427-1_5

Referenz:

Bucelli Irene (2016) „Specifically human?: the limited conception of self-consciousness in theories of reflective endorsement“, In: R. Winkler (ed.), Identity and difference, Dordrecht, Springer, 105–128.