On gluts in mathematics and science
pp. 91-101
Abstrakt
This essay investigates what role truth value gluts, statements that are both true and false, might play in accounting for inconsistencies in mathematics and science. More specifically, this essay asks whether truth value gluts should be designated values in such applications. Up to now, gluts have virtually always been designated, but I try to show that this might not be the best way to treat them.
Publication details
Published in:
Andreas Holger, Verdée Peter (2016) Logical studies of paraconsistent reasoning in science and mathematics. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 91-101
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-40220-8_6
Referenz:
Kapsner Andreas (2016) „On gluts in mathematics and science“, In: H. Andreas & P. Verdée (eds.), Logical studies of paraconsistent reasoning in science and mathematics, Dordrecht, Springer, 91–101.