The basic arguments presented in these essays sought to pacify some of the problems associated with subjectivity—showing how much more can be said about human conduct without reference to the "contents' of the consciousness of individuals in specific cases than might have been thought possible. Subsidiary arguments were also designed to show to what extent the ascription and avowal of mental-conduct categories turn upon essentially public grounds (and in particular upon the conventional consequentialities for social interaction of making such ascriptions and avowals). Although our analytical interest remains in conventional actor-orientations and reasoning-procedures, these are conceptualized as properties of the culture, rather than imputed directly by the analyst to the minds of individuals in particular settings whose actions form the data-base for analysis. In this way, the pit-falls of mentalist metaphysics and psychologism are avoided, and a fresh area of investigation is opened up: the description of the ways in which the culture permits us to ascribe and avow mental-conduct categories and expressions in our interpersonal affairs.